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Abstract
Often—for example in war games, strategy video games,
and financial simulations—the game is given to us only as
a black-box simulator in which we can play it. In these set-
tings, since the game may have unknown nature action distri-
butions (from which we can only obtain samples) and/or be
too large to expand fully, it can be difficult to compute strate-
gies with guarantees on exploitability. Recent work (Zhang
and Sandholm 2020) resulted in a notion of certificate for
extensive-form games that allows exploitability guarantees
while not expanding the full game tree. However, that work
assumed that the black box could sample or expand arbitrary
nodes of the game tree at any time, and that a series of exact
game solves (via, for example, linear programming) can be
conducted to compute the certificate. Each of those two as-
sumptions severely restricts the practical applicability of that
method. In this work, we relax both of the assumptions. We
show that high-probability certificates can be obtained with a
black box that can do nothing more than play through games,
using only a regret minimizer as a subroutine. As a bonus, we
obtain an equilibrium-finding algorithm with O˜(
√
T ) regret
bound in the extensive-form game setting that does not rely
on a sampling strategy with lower-bounded reach probabili-
ties (which MCCFR assumes). We demonstrate experimen-
tally that, in the black-box setting, our methods are able to
provide nontrivial exploitability guarantees while expanding
only a small fraction of the game tree.
1 Introduction
Computational equilibrium finding has led to many recent
breakthroughs in AI in games such as poker (Bowling et al.
2015; Brown and Sandholm 2017, 2019b) where the game
is fully known. However, in many applications, the game is
not fully known; instead, it is given only via a simulator that
permits an algorithm to play through the game repeatedly
(e.g., Wellman 2006; Lanctot et al. 2017). The algorithm
may never know the game exactly. While deep reinforce-
ment learning has yielded strong practical results in this set-
ting (Vinyals et al. 2019; Berner et al. 2019), those meth-
ods lack the low-exploitability guarantees of game-theoretic
techniques, even with infinite samples and computation. Fur-
thermore, the standard method of evaluating exploitability of
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a strategy—computing the equilibrium gap of the strategy—
is to compute a best response for each player. This, however,
assumes the whole game to be known exactly.
Recently, Zhang and Sandholm (2020) defined a notion of
certificate for imperfect-information extensive-form games
that can address these problems. A certificate enables veri-
fication of the exploitability of a given strategy without ex-
ploring the whole game tree. However, that work has a few
limitations that reduce its practical applicability. First, they
assume a black-box model that allows sampling or expand-
ing arbitrary nodes in the game tree. Yet most simulators
only allow the players to start from the root of the game,
and chance nodes in the simulator affect the path of play,
so exploration by jumping around in the game tree is not
supported. Second, their algorithm requires an exact game
solver, for example, a linear program (LP) solver, to be in-
voked repeatedly as a subroutine. This reduces the ability of
the algorithm to scale to cases in which LP is impractical
due to run time or memory considerations.
In this paper, we address both of these concerns. We give
algorithms that create certificates in extensive-form games in
a simple black-box model, with either an exact game solver
or a regret minimizer as a subroutine. We show that our al-
gorithms achieve convergence rate O(
√
log(T )/T ) (hiding
game-dependent constants). This matches, up to a logarith-
mic factor, the convergence rate of regret minimizers such as
counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al.
2007; Brown and Sandholm 2019a) or its stochastic vari-
ant, Monte Carlo CFR (MCCFR) (Lanctot et al. 2009; Fa-
rina, Kroer, and Sandholm 2020)—while also providing ver-
ifiable equilibrium gap guarantees unlike those prior tech-
niques. We prove that this convergence rate is optimal for
the setting. We demonstrate experimentally that our method
allows us to construct nontrivial certificates in games with
good sample efficiency, namely, while taking fewer samples
than there are nodes in the game. In contrast, the conver-
gence guarantees of CFR and MCCFR are vacuous if the
number of samples is smaller than the tree size.
As a side effect, we develop an algorithm for extensive-
form game solving that enjoys many of the same properties
of outcome-sampling MCCFR but works without the prob-
lematic assumption of having an a-priori uniformly-lower-
bounded “sampling vector” that is required by MCCFR.
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Our techniques also work for games where payoffs can be
received at internal nodes (not just at leaves), and for coarse-
correlated equilibrium in general-sum multi-player games.
2 Notation and background
We study extensive-form games, hereafter simply games. An
extensive-form game consists of:
(1) a set of players P , usually identified with positive inte-
gers 1, 2, . . . n. Nature, a.k.a. chance, will be referred to
as player 0. For a given player i, we will often use −i to
denote all players except i and nature.
(2) a finite tree H of nodes, rooted at some root node ∅. The
edges connecting a node h to its children are labeled with
actions. The set of actions at h will be denoted A(h). h 
z means z is a descendant of h, or z = h.
(3) a map P : H → P ∪ {0}, where P (h) is the player who
acts at node h (possibly nature).
(4) for each player i, a utility function ui : H → R. It will
be useful for us to allow players to gain utility at internal
nodes of the game tree. Along any path (h1, h2, . . . , hk),
define u(h1 → hk) =
∑k
i=1 u(hi) to be the total utility
gained along that path, including both endpoints. The goal
of each player is to maximize their total reward u(∅ → z).
(5) for each player i, a partition of player i’s decision points,
i.e., P−1(i), into information sets. In each information set
I , every h ∈ I must have the same set of actions.
(6) for each node h at which nature acts, a distribution σ0(·|h)
over the actions available to nature at node h.
We will use (G, u), or simply G when the utility function
is clear, to denote a game. G contains the tree and infor-
mation set structure, and u = (u1, . . . , un) is the profile of
utility functions.
For any history h ∈ H and any player i ∈ P , the sequence
si(h) of player i at node h is the sequence of information
sets observed and actions taken by i on the path from ∅ to
h. In this paper, all games will be assumed to have perfect
recall: if h1, h2 ∈ I and i acts at I , then si(h1) = si(h2).
A behavior strategy (hereafter simply strategy) σi for
player i is, for each information set I ∈ Ji at which
player i acts, a distribution σi(·|I) over the actions avail-
able at that infoset. When an agent reaches information set
I , it chooses action a with probability σi(a|I). A collection
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of behavior strategies, one for each player
i ∈ P , is a strategy profile. A distribution over strategy pro-
files is called a correlated strategy profile, and will also be
denoted σ. The reach probability σi(h) is the probability
that node h will be reached, assuming that player i plays
according to strategy σi, and all other players (including
nature) always choose actions leading to h when possible.
Analogously, we define σ(h) =
∏
i∈P∪{0} σi(h) to be the
probability that h is reached under strategy profile σ. This
definition naturally extends to sets of nodes or to sequences
by summing the reach probabilities of all relevant nodes.
Let Si be the set of sequences for player i. The sequence
form of a strategy σi is the vector x ∈ RSi given by x[s] =
σi(s). The set of all sequence-form strategies is the sequence
form strategy space for i, and is a convex polytope (Koller,
Megiddo, and von Stengel 1994).
The value of a profile σ for player i is ui(σ) :=
Ez∼σ ui(∅ → z). The future utility of a profile starting at
h is u(σ|h); that is, u(σ|h) = Ez∼σ|h u(h→ z).
The best response value u∗i (σ−i) for player i against an
opponent strategy σ−i is the largest achievable value; i.e.,
u∗i (σ−i) = maxσi ui(σi, σ−i). A strategy σi is an ε-best re-
sponse to opponent strategy σ−i if ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ u∗i (σ−i)−
ε. A best response is a 0-best response.
A strategy profile σ is an ε-Nash equilibrium (which we
will call ε-equilibrium for short) if all players are playing ε-
best responses. A Nash equilibrium is a 0-Nash equilibrium.
We also study finding certifiably good strategies for the
game-theoretic solution concept called coarse-correlated
equilibrium. In such equilibrium, if σ is correlated, the de-
viations σi when computing best response are not allowed
to depend on the shared randomness. A correlated strategy
profile σ is a coarse-correlated ε-equilibrium if all players
are playing ε-best responses under this restriction.
2.1 ε-equilibria within pseudogames
We now define pseudogames, first introduced by Zhang and
Sandholm (2020).
Definition 2.1. A pseudogame (G˜, α, β) is a game in which
some nodes do not have specified utility but rather have
only lower and upper bounds on utilities. Formally, for each
player i, instead of the standard utility function ui, there are
lower and upper bound functions αi, βi : H → R.
We will always use ∆ to mean β − α.
Definition 2.2. (G˜, α, β) is a trunk of a game (G, u) if:
(1) G˜ can be created by collapsing some internal nodes of G
into terminal nodes (and removing them from information
sets they are contained in), and
(2) for all nodes h of G, all players i, and all strategy profiles
σ, we have αi(σ|h) ≤ ui(σ|h) ≤ βi(σ|h).
It is possible for information sets to be partially or totally
removed in a trunk game. Next we state the basics of equi-
librium and coarse-correlated equilibrium in pseudogames.
Definition 2.3. A (coarse-correlated) ε-equilibrium of
(G˜, α, β) is a (correlated) profile σ such that the equilibrium
gap β∗i (σ−i)− αi(σ) of each player i is at most ε.
Definition 2.4. A (coarse-correlated) ε-certificate for a
game G is a pair (G˜, σ), where G˜ is a trunk of G and σ
is a (coarse-correlated) ε-equilibrium of G˜.
Proposition 2.5 (Zhang and Sandholm 2020). Let (G˜, σ)
be a ε-equilibrium for game G. Then any strategy profile
in G created by playing according to σ in any information
set appearing in G˜ and arbitrarily at information sets not
appearing in G˜ is a ε-equilibrium in G.
Though the above proposition was stated only for Nash
equilibrium by Zhang and Sandholm (2020), we observe that
it applies to coarse-correlated equilibria as well.
2.2 The zero-sum case
A two-player game is zero sum if u1 = −u2. In this case,
we refer to a single utility function u; it is understood that
Player 2’s utility function is −u. In zero-sum games, all
equilibria have the same expected value; this is called the
value of the game, and we denote it by u∗. In the zero-sum
case, we use a slightly different notion of ε-equilibrium of a
pseudogame, which will make the subsequent results tighter.
Definition 2.6. A two-player pseudogame (G˜, α, β) is zero-
sum if α2 = −β1 and β2 = −α1.
As alluded to above, in this situation, we will drop the
subscripts, and write α and β to mean α1 and β1. In partic-
ular, (G˜, α) and (G˜, β) are zero-sum games.
Definition 2.7. An ε-equilibrium of a two-player zero-sum
pseudogame (G˜, α, β) is a profile (x∗, y∗) for which the
Nash gap β∗(y∗)− α∗(x∗) is at most ε.
In zero-sum games, we need not concern ourselves with
correlation, since at least one player can always deviate to
playing independently of the other player and not lose utility.
In particular, a coarse-correlated ε-equilibrium remains an
ε-equilibrium if the correlations are removed.
2.3 Regret minimizers
Online convex optimization (OCO) (Zinkevich 2003) is
a rich framework through which to understand decision-
making in possibly adversarial environments.
Definition 2.8. LetX ⊆ Rn be a compact, convex set. A re-
gret minimizerAX onX is an algorithm that acts as follows.
At each time t = 1, 2, . . . T , the algorithmAX outputs a de-
cision xt ∈ X , and then receives a linear loss `t : X → R,
which may be generated adversarially.
The goal is to minimize the cumulative regret
RT := max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
[
`t(x
t)− `t(x)
]
.
For example, CFR and its modern variants achieve O(
√
T )
regret in sequence-form strategy spaces.
The connection between OCO and equilibrium-finding in
games is via the following observation. Let (σ1, . . . , σT ) be
any sequence of strategy profiles, and let σ¯ be the correlated
strategy profile that is uniform over σ1, . . . , σT . Suppose
that player i generated her strategy at time i via a regret min-
imizer, and achieved regret RT . Then, by definition of re-
gret, i is playing an ε-best response to σ¯, where ε = RT /T .
Thus, in particular, if all players are playing using a regret
minimizer with sublinear regret, the average strategy profile
σ¯ converges to a coarse-correlated equilibrium.
3 Black-box model and problem statement
Let (G, u) be an n-player game, which we assume to be
given to us as a black box. Given a profile σ, the black box
allows us to sample a playthrough from G under σ. We also
assume that, at every node h, we are given correct (but not
necessarily tight) bounds [α(h→ ∗), β(h→ ∗)] on the util-
ity u(h→ z) of every terminal descendant z  h; that is,
α(h→ ∗) ≤ min
zh
u(h→ z) ≤ max
zh
u(h→ z) ≤ β(h→ ∗).
Our goal in this paper is to develop equilibrium-finding algo-
rithms that give anytime, high-probability, instance-specific
exploitability guarantees that can be computed without ex-
panding the rest of the game tree, and are better than the
generic guarantees given by the worst-case runtime bounds
of algorithms like MCCFR. More formally, our goal is, af-
ter t playthroughs, to efficiently maintain a strategy profile
σt and bounds εi,t on the equilibrium gap of each player’s
strategy (or, in the zero-sum case, a single bound εt on the
Nash gap) that are correct with probability 1− 1/ poly(t).
4 Lower bound
Before proceeding to algorithms, we prove a lower bound
on the sample complexity of computing such a strategy pro-
file. Let γ > 0 be arbitrary. Consider a multi-armed bandit
instance in which the left arm has some unknown reward
distribution over {0, 1}, and the right arm always gives util-
ity 1/2. Let p be the probability that the left arm gives 1. We
will consider the two games, G− and G+, in which, respec-
tively, the left arm gives p = 1/2−ε and p = 1/2+ε, where
ε = Θ(
√
γ log(t)/t), and the Θ hides only an absolute con-
stant. Suppose t samples of the left arm are taken (the right
arm does not need to be sampled). We will say that the al-
gorithm has selected the correct arm if σt assigns a higher
probability to the better arm than it does to the worse arm.
Then the following two facts are simultaneously true.
(1) By binomial tail bounds, no algorithm can select the cor-
rect arm with probability better than 1−Θ(1/tγ).
(2) In the event that an algorithm fails to select the correct
arm at time t, its equilibrium gap is Θ(ε).
Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Any algorithm that provides the guarantees
described in Section 3 must have εi,t = Ω(
√
log(t)/t).
We will now describe algorithms matching this bound.
5 Exploration and confidence sequences
We now describe our main theoretical construction: a notion
of confidence sequence for games, that enables us to con-
struct high-probability certificates from playthroughs.
Definition 5.1. A confidence sequence for a game G is a se-
quence of pseudogames (Gˆt, αˆt, βˆt) created by the follow-
ing protocol. Start with Gˆ0 containing only one node and
trivial reward bounds. At each time t:
(1) Query an exploration policy A to obtain a profile σt
(2) Play a single game of G according to σt.
(3) Create Gˆt from Gˆt−1 as follows.
(a) Expand all nodes1 on the path of play.
1It is also valid to expand only the first new node on the path of
play. That does not change any of our theoretical results.
(b) For each chance node h in Gˆt:
(i) If h was encountered on the path of play, update
σˆt0(a|h) according to the action observed at h
(ii) Let
ρ(h) =
√
1
2th
(|Ah| log 2 + log t2Ctn). (5.2)
where th is the number of times h has been sampled
(including on this iteration), and Ct is the number
of chance nodes in Gˆt. Now set βˆti (h) = ui(h) +
ρ(h)∆(h→ ∗), and αˆti(h) = ui(h)−ρ(h)∆(h→ ∗).
We will use (Gt, αt, βt) to denote the pseudogame with
the same game tree as Gˆt, but with the exact correct nature
probabilities (that is, no sampling error, and ρ(h) = 0).
Theorem 5.3 (Correctness). For any time t, with probability
at least 1 − 2/t2, for every profile σ and player i, we have
αˆti(σ) ≤ αi(σ) ≤ βi(σ) ≤ βˆti (σ).
Proofs are in the appendix. In this case, we will call the se-
quence correct at time t. These probabilities can be strength-
ened to any inverse polynomial function of t by replacing t2
in Equation (5.2) with a suitably larger polynomial.
Extra domain-specific information about the chance dis-
tributions can easily be incorporated into the bounds. For
example, if two chance nodes are known to have the same
action distribution, their samples can be merged. If the dis-
tribution of a chance node is known exactly, no sampling
is necessary at all, and the number of chance nodes Ct in
Equation (5.2) may be decremented accordingly.
Definition 5.4. For an exploration policy A creating a con-
fidence sequence (Gˆt, αˆt, βˆt), the cumulative uncertainty
Ui,T for player i after the first T iterations is given by
Ui,T :=
T∑
t=1
∆ˆti(σ
t).
This can be thought of as the regret of an online optimizer
that plays σt at time t, and then observes loss βˆti − αˆti. In a
sense, the next result is the main theorem of our paper, and
we find it the most surprising result of the paper. All our
convergence guarantees stated later in the paper rely on it.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose that the true rewards are bounded in
[0, 1]. Then for all times T , all players i, and any exploration
policy A, we have
EUi,T ≤ 2CT
√
2TM +NT
where NT is the number of total nodes in GˆT ,
M = max
chance nodes h
(|Ah| log 2 + log 2T 2CTn),
and the expectation is over the sampling of games and (if
applicable) the randomness of A.
M is a constant that depends on the final pseudogame
GˆT . Importantly, it does not depend on the actual game G!
This makes it possible for our approach to give meaningful
exploitability guarantees while not exploring the full game.
For fixed underlying game and confidence, M increases as
Θ(log T ), and hence Ui,T increases as O(
√
T log T ).
6 Solving games via confidence intervals
The above discussion leads naturally to algorithms that gen-
erate certificates, which we will now discuss.
Algorithm 6.1 Two-player zero-sum certificate finding
1: Input: black-box zero-sum game
2: Initialize confidence sequence (Gˆ0, αˆ0, βˆ0)
3: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
4: Solve (Gˆt−1, αˆt−1) and (Gˆt−1, βˆt−1) exactly to ob-
tain equilibria (
¯
xt−1,
¯
yt−1) and (x¯t−1, y¯t−1).
5: Create next pseudogame Gˆt by sampling one
playthrough according to some profile σt
Definition 6.2. The Nash gap bound εt at time t of Algo-
rithm 6.1 is εt = βˆ∗t − αˆ∗t
Proposition 6.3. Assuming that the confidence sequence is
correct at time t, the pessimistic equilibrium (
¯
xt, y¯t) com-
puted by Algorithm 6.1 is an εt-equilibrium of Gt.
This allows us to know (with high probability) when we
have found an ε-equilibrium, without expanding the remain-
der of the game tree, even in the case when chance’s strategy
is not directly observable. The choice of exploration policy
in Line 5 is very important. We now discuss that.
Definition 6.4. The optimistic exploration policy is σt =
(x¯t−1,
¯
yt−1); that is, both players explore according to the
optimistic pseudogame.
Proposition 6.5. Under the optimistic policy, εt ≤ ∆ˆt(σt).
Together with Theorem 5.5, this immediately gives us a
convergence bound on Algorithm 6.1:
Corollary 6.6. Suppose we use optimistic exploration, and
the true game G has rewards bounded in [0, 1]. Let ε∗T be
the known bound on the Nash gap of the best pessimistic
equilibrium found so far; that is, ε∗T = mint≤T εt. Then
E ε∗T ≤ 2CT
√
2M
T
+
1
T
NT .
This is not the same kind of bound that is achieved by
MCCFR and related algorithms. Those algorithms guaran-
tee an upper bound on exploitability as a function of total
runtime; here, we bound the number of samples. After ev-
ery sample, our Algorithm 6.1 solves the entire pseudogame
generated so far. This may be expensive (though, since the
game solves can be implemented as LP solves with warm
starts from the previous iteration, in practice they are still
reasonably efficient). However, as in Zhang and Sandholm
(2020), our convergence guarantee has the distinct advan-
tage of being dependent only on the current pseudogame,
not the underlying full game. In this setting, the guarantee
of regret minimization algorithms such as MCCFR would
be vacuous until the total time exceeds the number of se-
quences in the full game. Furthermore, as the experiments
later in this paper show, in practice, ε∗T is usually signifi-
cantly smaller than its worst-case bound.
In several special cases, Algorithm 6.1 corresponds natu-
rally to known algorithms and results.
(1) Perfect information and deterministic: Assuming the
game solves return pure strategies (which is always pos-
sible here), Algorithm 6.1 is exactly the same as Algo-
rithm 6.7 of Zhang and Sandholm (2020). In particular, in
the two-player case, it is equivalent to incremental alpha-
beta search; in the one-player case, it is equivalent to A*
search (Hart, Nilsson, and Raphael 1968), where the up-
per bound β(h → ∗) corresponds to the heuristic lower
bound on the total distance from the root to the goal.
(2) Nature probabilities known: Algorithm 6.1 is very similar
(but not identical, due to the simpler black-box model) to
Algorithm 6.7 of Zhang and Sandholm (2020).
(3) Multi-armed stochastic bandit: Algorithm 6.1 is, up
to a constant factor in Equation (5.2), equivalent to
UCB1 (Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer 2002), and
Corollary 6.6 matches the worst-case O(
√
T log T ) de-
pendence on T in the regret bound of UCB1. The worse
dependence on the number of arms can be remedied by a
more detailed analysis, which we skip here.
In practice, due to the computational cost of the game
solves, we recommend running several samples per game
solve. This enhances computational efficiency in domains
where the game is not prohibitively large for LPs, or sam-
ples are relatively fast to obtain.
7 Faster iterates via regret minimization
A major weakness of Algorithm 6.1 is its reliance on an
exact game solver as a subroutine, which can be slow or
even infeasible computationally. Could we replace the exact
solver with a single iteration of some iterative game solver,
and still maintain the O˜(1/
√
T ) convergence rate? In this
section we show how to do this with regret minimizers.
7.1 Extendable regret minimizers
We now define a class of regret minimizers, which we coin
extendable, which we can use to achieve the goal mentioned
above. Intuitively, for an extendable family of regret mini-
mizers, expending a leaf of the pseudogame does not change
the behavior or regret of the regret minimizer, so long as the
past losses do not depend on the actions taken at the new in-
formation set, which is always the case with our algorithms
because they have never visited the new information set.
Thus, when working with a extendable family A, it makes
sense to speak about “running A on a game G”, even if in-
formation sets may be added toG over time. We will exploit
this language. For example, CFR (thus also MCCFR, since
it is nothing but CFR with stochastic gradient estimates (Fa-
rina, Kroer, and Sandholm 2020)) is a extendable family. In
this case, the function φ described below simply initializes
regrets at the new information set to 0.
Formally, let L(X) be the set of linear functions on X .
Consider a regret minimizerAX onX . We will think ofAX
as maintaining a state st ∈ SX . At any time t, the algorithm
outputs strategy xt ← xX(st) for some map xX : SX → X ,
and after observing loss `t, the algorithm updates the state
via st+1 ← uX(st, `t), where uX : SX × L(X) → SX is
an update function. As such, AX can be thought of as a pair
(xX , uX). For example, when X is the n-simplex and AX
is regret matching (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), SX is Rn,
the update function is uX(st, `t) = st + `t − 〈`t, xX(st)〉,
and the strategy is xC(st)(i) ∝ [st(i)]+.
Definition 7.1. Let A = {AX} be a family of regret mini-
mizers, one for each extensive-form strategy space X . A is
extendable if for every X and every X ′ ⊆ X × Rm formed
by adding a decision point (with m actions) to X , there is a
function φ : SX → SX′ such that for every state s ∈ SX :
(1) xX′(φ(s)) agrees with xX(s) in X , and
(2) for every loss function ` ∈ L(X), we have φ(uX(s, `)) =
uX′(φ(s), (`, 0)), where (`, 0)∈L(X ′)=L(X)×L(Rm).
7.2 Putting it together
Algorithm 7.2 Certificate-finding with regret minimization
1: Input: black-box game, extendable family Ai for each
player i
2: Initialize confidence sequence (Gˆ0, αˆ0, βˆ0)
3: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
4: Query each Ai to obtain a strategy σti
5: Submit loss −βˆti (·, σt−i) to Ai
6: Create next pseudogame Gˆt by sampling one
playthrough according to σt
Even in the two-player zero-sum case, this algorithm is
not the exact generalization of Algorithm 6.1. That general-
ization would involve independently solving the lower- and
upper-bound games (Gˆt, αˆt) and (Gˆt, βˆt) using a total of
four regret minimizers, not two. This algorithm has no need
to store or refer to pessimistic strategies. It suffices to use
only the optimistic strategy. As usual when dealing with re-
gret minimization, we will discuss convergence of the aver-
age (optimistic) strategy played by each player.
Proposition 7.3. Suppose that the true rewards are bounded
in [0, 1]. After t iterations of the for loop on Line 3, assum-
ing the correctness of the confidence sequence at time t, the
average optimistic profile σ¯t forms a coarse-correlated ap-
proximate equilibrium of Gt, in which the equilibrium gap
for player i is at most εi,t = βˆ∗ti (σ¯
t
−i)− αˆti(σ¯t).
Thus, Algorithm 7.2 is an anytime algorithm whose equi-
librium gap bound at any time t can be easily computed
by linear passes through the pseudogame Gˆt. In the two-
player zero-sum case (wherein, for notation, β = β1 and
α = −β2 and σ¯t = (x¯t,
¯
yt)), we can use the slightly tighter
εt = βˆ
∗t(
¯
yt)− αˆ∗t(x¯t) as a Nash gap bound.
7.3 Convergence rate
Annoyingly, it is not the case in general that εi,t =
O˜(Nt/
√
t). Appendix B.1 provides a counterexample. In-
tuitively, the reason is that, for a fixed strategy σ, the upper
bound βˆt(σ) is not a monotonically nonincreasing function
of t; indeed, for strategies σ that are not sampled very fre-
quently, βˆt(σ) may fluctuate by large amounts even when
Figure 1: Convergence of Algorithm 6.1 and Algorithm 7.2 in 4-rank Goofspiel and 13-card limit Leduc. To be consistent
with the other algorithms, one “iteration” of MCCFR consists of one accepted loss vector per player. For the other algorithms,
one “iteration” is one playthrough. In all cases, we show both the provable equilibrium gap βˆ∗t(σt) − αˆ∗t(σt) and the true
equilibrium gap β∗t(σt) − α∗t(σt). The exception is MCCFR, which on its own does not give provable equilibrium gaps in
the same way. The horizontal line is at the game’s reward range (Goofspiel has reward range [−10, 10] and 13-rank Leduc has
[−13, 13], so the lines are at 20 and 26, respectively), and the vertical line is at the number of nodes in the game (Goofspiel has
54,421 nodes and 13-rank Leduc has 166,366).
Sampling-limited Compute-limited
Unknown nature distributions Algorithm 6.1 with LP solver Algorithm 7.2 with a CFR variant
(e.g., outcome-sampling MCCFR)Known nature distributions Algorithm 6.7 of Zhang and Sandholm (2020)
Table 1: Algorithms we suggest by use case in two-player zero-sum games. Sampling-limited means that the black-box game
simulator is relatively slow or expensive compared to solving the pseudogames. Compute-limited means that the simulator is
fast or cheap compared to solving the pseudogames. In general-sum games, only Algorithm 7.2 is usable.
t is large. However, the nonmonotonicity of βˆt is, in some
sense, necessary to achieve the high-probability correctness
guarantee. If βˆt does not increase over time, then the prob-
ability that it is an incorrect bound remains constant, rather
than decreasing polynomially with time as would be desired.
To study the convergence rate of Algorithm 7.2, then, we
will instead analyze the quantity
ε¯i,T = max
σi
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
βˆti (σi, σ
t
−i)− αˆti(σt)
]
+O
(
1√
T
)
=
1
T
[Ri,T + Ui,T ] +O
(
1√
T
)
where theO hides only an absolute constant. This quantity is
identical to εi,t except that it uses βˆti with σ
t
−i instead of βˆ
T
i
to match the regret term, and has an extra error term added.
Proposition 7.4. With probability 1−O(1/√T ), ε¯i,T is an
actual equilibrium gap bound.
By Theorem 5.5, UT = O˜(NT
√
T ). Thus, this theorem
matches the worst-case convergence of any algorithm with
regret O˜(NT /
√
T ), up to a logarithmic factor. For example,
using CFR and variants thereof matches the bound of Corol-
lary 6.6 with iterates that are linear time in the size of the
pseudogame. With MCCFR, the iterates can be made even
faster, and due to Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm (2020), even
outcome-sampling MCCFR can be used without breaking
the O˜(NT /
√
T ) runtime bound.
Unfortunately, there is a further problem. It is often un-
wieldy to compute ε¯i,T . For example, if using outcome-
sampling MCCFR, one may not even have access to the
true bounds βˆt(·, σt−i) (and similar for α) but only stochas-
tic estimates β˜t(·, σ˜t−i) with the correct conditional expec-
tation (Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm 2020). In that case, the
stochastic estimate may be used as a substitute to create a
stochastic equilibrium gap bound
ε˜i,T = max
σi
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
β˜ti (σi, σ
t
−i)− α˜ti(σt)
]
+O
(
M
√
1
T
log T
)
where M is a bound on the norm of the estimates; i.e.,∣∣∣β˜ti (σi, σ˜ti)− β˜ti (σ′i, σ˜ti)∣∣∣ ≤ M for every pair of strategies
σi, σ
′
i. As discussed by Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm (2020),
with a uniform sampling vector, we can achieve M ≤ NT .
Proposition 7.5. With probability 1−1/T , for every time T
and player i, we have ε˜i,T ≥ ε¯i,T .
Thus, in particular, we have:
Corollary 7.6. ε∗i,T := min(εi,T , ε˜i,T ) = O˜(NT /
√
T ) is
an equilibrium gap bound with probability 1−O(1/√T ).
This is the desired result. In practice, ε˜i,T is trivial until
T = Ω(N2T ), and εi,T is almost always a better bound. Thus,
in our experiments, we use only εi,T . For this reason and for
clarity, we have not bothered to specify the constants in the
big-Os. Nevertheless, it is desirable theoretically to be able
to define a quantity ε∗i,T that has both O˜(NT /
√
T ) conver-
gence and (high-probability) correctness. As before, the cor-
rectness probability can be raised to any inverse-polynomial
function of T by a suitable change to Equation (5.2).
As an equilibrium-finding algorithm, Algorithm 7.2 is a
“weaker” version of just running the underlying regret min-
imizers on the full game: instead of each regret minimizer
getting access to the true losses, they only get access to an
upper bound. However, its main advantage over regret min-
imization is, as before, its ability to give a equilibrium gap
bound that can be computed without full knowledge of the
remainder of the game or exact nature action probabilities.
Finally, Algorithm 7.2 has an unintuitive property.
Warning 7.7. If Ai are stochastic regret minimizers (e.g.
MCCFR), instead of submitting −βˆti (·, σt−i), it may be
tempting to submit a noisy (sampled) version of−βti (·, σt−i).
Then the actual equilibrium gap β∗ti (σ¯
t
−i)−αti(σ¯t) will con-
verge, but the provable equilibrium gap ε¯i,t may not. For a
counterexample, see Appendix B.2.
7.4 The case of known nature probabilities:
MCCFR without uniform sampling
If the nature probabilities are assumed to be known exactly,
Warning 7.7 does not apply, since the actual bounds (αt, βt)
and the sampled bounds (αˆt, βˆt) are the same. Even in this
case, Algorithm 7.2 is still noteworthy: if we run it with
outcome-sampling MCCFR, the result is an MCCFR-like
algorithm (i.e., an equilibrium finder in the black-box case)
that operates without an a-priori “uniform sampling strat-
egy”. Indeed, the iterations only require a uniform sampling
strategy over the current pseudogame, not the full game!
That algorithm is not quite a regret minimizer in the usual
sense: its convergence rate depends on the uncertainty of the
sampling method, and is tied to the fact that the sampling in
Line 6 of Algorithm 7.2 uses the current strategy.
8 Experiments
We conducted experiments on two common benchmarks:
(1) k-rank Goofspiel. At each time t = 1, . . . , k, both players
simultaneously place a bid for a prize. The prizes have
values 1, . . . , k, and are randomly shuffled. The valid bids
are also 1, . . . , k, each of which must be used exactly once
during the game. The higher bid wins the prize; in case of
a tie, the prize is split. The winner of each round is made
public, but the bids are not. Our experiments use k = 4.
(2) k-rank heads-up limit Leduc poker (Southey et al. 2005),
a small two-player variant of poker played with one hole
card per player and one community card. Our experiments
use a full range of poker ranks (k = 13).
We tested four algorithm variants. Except in the last case,
which we will describe, all certificate-finding algorithms as-
sume that the nature distributions are independent of player
actions. In Goofspiel, we assume further that the nature dis-
tributions are independent of past nature actions, which is
true (nature always plays uniformly at random).
(1) MCCFR with outcome sampling (OS-MCCFR) (Lanctot
et al. 2009) (MCCFR). This algorithm requires the game
tree to be fully expanded, and does not give a (nontrivial)
certificate. However, it does give a benchmark for actual
equilibrium gap convergence.
(2) Algorithm 7.2 with OS-MCCFR as the regret minimizer
(Cert-MCCFR).
(3) Algorithm 6.1, with LP for the game solves (Cert-LP).
Since the LP solves are relatively expensive, we only re-
compute the LP solution every 100 playthroughs sampled.
This does not change the asymptotic performance of the
algorithm. We use Gurobi v9.0.0 (Gurobi Optimization,
LLC 2019) as the LP solver.
(4) Algorithm 6.1, except with no assumptions on relation-
ships between nature distributions (Cert-LP-Indep).
Figure 1 shows the results. As expected, all the algorithms
show a long-term convergence rate of roughly Θ˜(1/
√
t). All
certificate-finding algorithms find nontrivial provable certifi-
cates with fewer samples than it would take to expand the
whole game tree, showing the efficacy of our method.
9 Conclusion and future research
We developed algorithms that construct high-probability
certificates in games with only black-box access. Our
method can be used with either an exact game solver (e.g.,
LP solver) as a subroutine or a regret minimizer such as
MCCFR. Table 1 shows which algorithm we recommend
based on the use case. As a side effect, we developed an
MCCFR-like equilibrium-finding algorithm that converges
at rate O˜(
√
log(t)/t), and does not require a lower-bounded
sampling vector. Our experiments show that our algorithms
produce nontrivial certificates with very few samples.
This work opens many avenues for future research.
(1) Is there a “cleaner” way to fix the problem introduced
in Section 7.3? For example, a different confidence se-
quence may fix the problem, or it could be the case that
εi,T is small for most times t (or even only a constant frac-
tion), which would show that mint≤T εi,T = O˜(1/
√
T ),
matching Corollary 6.6.
(2) Is it possible to adapt Algorithm 7.2 to work with a
generic extensive-form iterative game solver, for exam-
ple, first-order methods such as EGT (Hoda et al. 2010;
Kroer, Farina, and Sandholm 2018)?
(3) In many practical games, there are nature nodes h for
which, under a particular profile σ, every child of h has
similar utility: the range of utilities of the children of h
under σ is far smaller than [α(h → ∗), β(h → ∗)]. Is
it possible to incorporate this sort of information into the
confidence-sequence pseudogames without losing perfect
recall (which is needed for efficient solving?)
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A Proofs of Theorems
A.1 Theorem 5.3
Lemma A.1. Fix a player i and chance node h. With probability at least 1− 2/t2Cn, for any assignment u : Children(h)→
[α, β] of utilities, we have ∣∣∣∣ Ea∼σ0|hu(ha)− Ea∼σˆ0|hu(ha)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (β − α)ρ(h).
Proof. If ρ = 1 the claim is trivial, so assume ρ < 1. The desired error term is a convex function of u, so we need only prove
the theorem for u : Children(h) → {α, β}. By definition, σˆ0|h was created by sampling t(h) times. Thus, by Hoeffding, we
have
Pr
[∣∣∣∣ Ea∼σ0|hu(ha)− Ea∼σˆ0|hu(ha)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ (β − α)ρ] ≤ 2 exp(−2t(h)ρ(h)2)
= 2 exp
(−|Ah| log 2− log t2Cn)
=
21−|A(h)|
t2Cn
Taking a union bound over the 2|Ah| choices of u completes the proof.
Thus, by a union bound, with probability 1− 2/t2, the above lemma is true for every player and chance node. Condition on
this event, and take any player i and any profile σ. For notation, let σˆ be the strategy profile in which chance plays according to
σˆ0 and the players play according to σ.
Lemma A.2. At every node h, we have the bounds αˆi(σ|h) ≤ αi(σ|h) ≤ βi(σ|h) ≤ βˆi(σ|h).
Proof. By induction, leaves first. At the leaves, the lemma is trivial. Let h be any internal node. Then we have
αˆi(σ|h) = E
a∼σˆi|h
αˆi(σ|ha)− ρ(h)∆i(h→ ∗)
≤ E
a∼σˆi|h
αi(σ|ha)− ρ(h)∆i(h→ ∗)
≤ E
a∼σi|h
αi(σ|ha)
= αi(σ|h).
where the first two inequalities use, in order, the inductive hypothesis and the last lemma. An identical proof holds for β, and
we are done.
The theorem now follows by applying the above lemma with h = ∅.
A.2 Theorem 5.5
Assume WLOG there is only one player, and drop the subscript i accordingly. Define the sampled cumulative uncertainty UˆT
as
UˆT :=
T∑
t=1
∆ˆt(zt)
where zt is the last node in Gˆt reached during the play at time t. By linearity of expectation, we have E UˆT = EUT . Define
Uˆ∆K (h) to be the sampled regret at node h after node h is sampled K times. Formally,
UˆK(h) :=
K∑
k=1
∆ˆth,k(h→ zth,k)
where th,k is the kth timestep on which h was sampled. Conveniently, UˆK(h) can be analyzed independently of the rest of the
game. Our goal is to bound UˆT = UˆT (∅).
Let Nk(h) be the number of descendants of h, including h itself, at time th,k. Let Ck(h) be the same, except only counting
chance nodes. Let ρk(h) be the value of ρ(h) after k samples at h. Once again, these quantities are independent of what happens
outside the subgame rooted at h. We now prove a lemma, which has the theorem as the special case h = ∅.
Lemma A.3. For every exploration policy A, any node h of G, and any time K, we have
E UˆK(h) ≤ 2Ck(h)
√
2KM +NK(h).
Proof. By induction on the nodes of the game tree, leaves first. For each child ha of h, let Ka be the number of times action a
has been sampled.
Base case. If h is a leaf of G, then uncertainty at most 1 will be incurred when the leaf is expanded for the first time.
Inductive case.
E UˆK(h) ≤ ∆(h→ ∗)
(
1 + 2
K∑
k=1
ρk(h)
)
+
∑
a∈Ah
E UˆKa(ha)
≤ 1 + 2
K∑
k=1
√
M
2k
+
∑
a∈Ah
[
CKa(ha)
√
2KaM +NKa(ha).
]
≤ 2CK(h)
√
2KM +NK(h)
where the three terms come from:
(1) a regret of at most 1, incurred when h is first expanded,
(2) the regret incurred at h itself, if it is a chance node, and
(3) the regret incurred at each child node.
Once again, the theorem is the above lemma applied with h = ∅.
A.3 Proposition 6.3 and Proposition 7.3
Follow immediately from Theorem 5.3.
A.4 Proposition 6.5
Follows immediately from the definition of a pseudogame.
A.5 Proposition 7.4
Taking a union bound over times t ≥ √T in Theorem 5.3, we have that, with probability 1−O(1/√T ), βˆti (σi, σt−i)−αˆti(σt) ≥
βt(σi, σ
t
−i)− αt(σt) for all t ≥
√
T . The bound follows.
A.6 Proposition 7.5
Identical to Theorem 1 of Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm (2020).
B Counterexamples
B.1 Rate of convergence of the upper bound in Proposition 7.3
Consider the following multi-armed bandit instance with two arms, formulated as a one-player game: the left arm gives loss
−K with probability 1/K, and 0 with probability 1− 1/K. The right arm gives loss −1 deterministically.
With probability Θ(1/K), the first Θ(K2)+1 samples of the left arm give rewards exactly (−K,−K, . . . ,−K, 0). Condition
on this event.
After Θ(K2) samples of the left arm, its upper bound will be
−K + Θ
(
K
√
1
K2
log T
)
= −K + Θ(
√
log T )
The Θ(K2)+1st sample will not happen until the upper bound exceeds at least−1, which only happens once T > exp(Θ(K2)).
Upon taking the Θ(K2) + 1st sample, the upper bound on the left arm’s utility will increase by Θ(1). But the reward range of
this game is [−K, 0], so now taking any K = o(√T ) completes the counterexample.
B.2 Warning 7.7
For example, consider the one-player multi-armed bandit case with two arms of differing utilities u(L) < u(R). Then the
following two statements are simultaneously true:
(1) With MCCFR, with probability 1, there will exist some time T after which L will no longer be played ever again.
(2) βˆt(L) will increase without bound if it is not played.
Thus, eventually, we will have βˆt(L) > βˆt(R), after which time the provable equilibrium gap will always be at least their
difference.
